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This is the second installment of the LNG in PA blog series. In this blog, we’ll discuss the dangers posed by the transportation of LNG across Pennsylvania. If you missed it, please check out our first blog, What is Liquefied Natural Gas?
In the first blog, we explained that Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) reduces the volume of natural gas by a factor of 600, making it possible to transport large volumes over long distances.
Traditionally, LNG has travelled over oceans by tanker, a voyage that by definition is remote. LNG was considered too dangerous for large scale rail transport and was banned in the US without a special permit. That all changed this summer. A new rule from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) allows dangerous LNG trains to barrel through towns and cities in Pennsylvania without warning and without increased safety measures.
Bomb Trains
Trains that transport hazardous and highly flammable materials like LNG have the notorious label of “bomb trains.” The energy contained in the cars is enough to create explosions on par with actual bombs. The danger of bomb trains comes from accidents like derailments or maintenance issues like valve malfunctions. Life-threatening risks of LNG trains are BLEVE, RPT, fire, asphyxiation, and cryogenic burns. These bomb trains run the same lines through our Pennsylvania towns as any other train and blow through towns with no warning. They are accidents waiting to happen.
Unexpected Explosions
BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. A BLEVE occurs when equipment malfunctions, allowing heat into the LNG container. As the LNG heats up it vaporizes and becomes gas—and 600 times bigger. If this process continues, the volume of the tank can no longer hold the gas. The pressurized LNG explodes, creating a blast wave that destroys the container, turning it into shrapnel in the air. The spilled LNG pools in vapor clouds as it continues to evaporate. These vapor clouds can ignite and catch on fire upon contact with an ignition source. A 2013 BLEVE caused by a crude oil train derailment in the heart of a town in Quebec, Canada, tragically killed 47 people.
RPT, Rapid Phase Transition, is a risk when LNG unexpectedly spills onto water. The spilled LNG both evaporates and spills on top of the water. RPT is a flameless “vapor explosion” caused by the “abrupt and simultaneous evaporation of a large amount of LNG. Since gas takes up a lot more space than liquid, a sudden transition will appear explosive.” The force from this “vapor explosion” can injure people and property nearby.
Fires That Can’t Be Put Out
Technically, and as the LNG industry loves to point out, LNG is not flammable. But, LNG is just liquefied natural gas, which we all know is flammable. LNG evaporates at the introduction of any heat, such as a leak, and becomes highly flammable natural gas. Large leaks create vapor clouds that spread over the ground.
If a vapor cloud comes into contact with an ignition source before it evaporates it can catch fire. An LNG fire “burns far more hotly and rapidly than oil or gasoline fires. It cannot be extinguished.” Until all of the LNG in the cloud burns, the fire won’t go out, and it can’t be put out with water. The chances of fire increase if the vapor cloud is trapped in a confined area, slowing evaporation. (Remember that evaporation means the potent greenhouse gas methane is released directly into the atmosphere).
In the case of a 2014 accident in Plymouth, Washington, a fire caused an explosion at an LNG storage facility, injuring 5 workers. Because of the danger, emergency responders were unable to enter the facility for hours, until the LNG entirely leaked out of the damaged storage container. All residents within two miles of the storage facility were evacuated for their safety.
Exaggerated Safety
Despite the known risks of LNG, the industry touts LNG as extremely safe, even bragging that it’s drinkable. But of course, drinking a liquid that is -260 degrees is impossible, and would result in cryogenic burns. And inhaling LNG would mean inhaling methane, also very dangerous. Enough methane can displace oxygen in the air and cause asphyxiation. The industry downplays the real risk of LNG rushing through unknowing communities. But safety protocol calls for a 1-mile evacuation radius in case of an LNG train accident. A Pennsylvania route will cut through metropolitan Philadelphia, putting thousands of people in jeopardy every day.
Rush to Rails
In 2017, the Association of American Railroads, echoing demand from the natural gas industry, petitioned PHMSA to allow LNG trains in the US. In April 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order calling for PHMSA to allow LNG rail transport by May 2020. Just a little later than ordered, PHMSA delivered; the rule went into effect last weekend on July 19, 2020.
Mixed Signals
But PHMSA is not sending clear signals to the public guaranteeing that LNG trains will actually be safe. For starters, the current version of the rule doesn’t match previous pilot programs testing LNG train safety.
LNG transport under special permits has been operational in Florida and Alaska since 2016 and included some safety measures like transport in special United Nations portable tanks, 40 mph maximum speeds, special training for personnel in loading and unloading LNG, 10 car limits per train, and one trip per day. But the results of these pilot programs are not published. Even after going through a Freedom of Information Act request, members of the public were given almost entirely redacted records of the program’s risk assessment.
PHMSA points to a safe record of the pilot program in support nationwide LNG trains, without transparent data to back it up. And the new rule sets up a whole new playing field: it looks nothing like the test run. None of the safety measures listed made it into the new rule, and it uses untested model DOT-113 tank cars, rather than tested the UN portable tanks.
Choosing Industry Over Safety
Many organizations, including the National Transportation Safety Board and the National Association of State Fire Marshals, opposed the new rule and urged PHMSA to require more stringent measures for LNG rail transport. Of the many basic safety measures called for and not implemented by PHMSA in its new rule were:
Safety Measure Called For |
PHMSA Response |
Conduct field tests on the DOT-113 tank car for its ability to transport LNG safely before transport begins. |
Historic safety data for transports of similar products in DOT-113 cars is good enough, specific safety testing is not needed. |
Require the enhanced braking of Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) brakes to help bring trains to a quick stop in case of emergency and prevent derailment. |
ECP brakes are too expensive to require railroads to use. |
Limit the number of cars on a train carrying LNG – up to 100 cars of LNG per train is too many to be safe. |
“[T]rain length is best determined by individual railroads.” |
Impose speed limits, especially when travelling through highly populated, urban areas. |
Safety measures like this are best left to an “industry voluntary approach.” |
Keep a minimum of 5 cars between locomotives with human operators and the dangerous LNG cars. |
PHMSA will study this “separation distance” recommendation, but the rule won’t change. |
Undergo “protective re-routing” analysis to avoid highly populated urban areas and other sensitive sites. |
More routing analysis would increase LNG transport safety, but railroads will be in charge of carrying it out. |
Time and again, PHMSA leaves it up to the railroads to guard public safety. But that leaves the public’s voice out of the conversation, and all but guarantees the public won’t have access to safety and performance records. One safety improvement in new rule was adding 2/16” of steel thickness requirement for the outer hull of the DOT-113 tank. Yet these new-model rail cars will still be used to transport LNG without field testing.
Bomb Trains Through Pennsylvania
LNG bomb trains threaten Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, a special permit already allows the transport of LNG by rail from Bradford County to a proposed export facility in Gibbstown, NJ, although the LNG facility is not yet operational. However, the route LNG trains will take is not yet public information, leaving the public without vital information needed to keep bomb trains out of their communities. The rush to rails should not be at the expense of public knowledge and safety.
The next blog in the series will be written by PennFuture board member and one of the founders of Protect Northern PA, Diana Dakey. It will detail the ongoing fight against the “dry” LNG facility being built in Wyalusing, PA.
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